



Participants

A. Jorge Aguilera López (Helsinki University)
Martin Almbjär (Uppsala University)
Francisco Cebreiro Ares (Universidad de Sevilla)
Enrique Corredra Nilsson (University of Bern)
Pelayo Fernández García (University of Oviedo)
Santiago Gorostiza (Sciences Po, Paris)
Erica Heinsen-Roach (University of South
Florida, St. Petersburg)
Patricia Hertel (Basel University)
German Jiménez Montes (Groningen
University)
Klemens Kaps (Linz University)
Manuel Lucena Giraldo (CSIC, Madrid)

Kenneth Nyberg (University of Gothenburg)
Andreas Önnarfors (Uppsala University)
Sven Olofsson (Mid Sweden University,
Sundsvall)
Benito Peix Geldart (Centre for Business
History, Stockholm)
Eleonora Poggio (Linnaeus University)
Javier Ponce Marrero (University of Las Palmas
de Gran Canaria)
Renate Schreiber (Independent scholar, Vienna)
Therese Svensson (University of Gothenburg)
Barnabás Szabó (Central European University)
Ingmar Söhrman (University of Gothenburg)

Zoom

To participate in the workshop you will need to use Zoom. You can access the meeting room through any web browser, but we recommend that you use the Zoom application which you can download here: <https://zoom.us/>

Below is the meeting information you need. Either click the link or use the ID and passcode when connecting manually (please do not circulate or publish this information):

Topic: Historical Spanish-Swedish Connections

Schedule

10th May 2021

8:30 Introduction, practical information, round of brief presentations

8:45 Introductory notes

His Excellency Teppo **Tauriainen**, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden to Spain
Her Excellency Cristina **Latorre Sancho**, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to Sweden

9:15 Javier **Ponce Marrero**, “A first comparative approach to Spanish and Swedish humanitarian aid during the First World War”

9:45 Short Break

9:55 Benito **Peix Geldart**, “Neutrals against war: Swedish-Spanish initiatives within the League of Nations 1933–1936”

10:25 Santiago **Gorostiza**, “Building a database of the Swedish volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)”

10:55 Coffee Break

11:25 German **Jiménez Montes**, “Connections between Sweden and Andalusia (1500–1650): Trade and identity”

11:55 Sven **Olofsson**, “Swedish copper on Spanish ships: Production, trade and diplomacy during the second half of the 18th century”

12:25 Short Break

12:35 A. Jorge **Aguilera López**, “Beyond the unsuccessful alliance: Spanish-Swedish relations in the time of Philip II (1571–1598)”

13:05 Enrique **Corredera Nilsson**, “Describing Iberia: Nils Nilsson Brahe’s travel to Spain and Portugal in 1655”

13:35 Lunch

14:35 Renate **Schreiber**, “Queen Kristina of Sweden in Brussels 1654–1655”

15:05 Ingmar **Söhrman**, “The supposed Scandinavian origin of the Goths: An emblematic argument in Spanish historiography”

15:35 Conclusion

11th May 2021

8:30 Pelayo **Fernández García**, “Spain and Sweden’s international redefinition around the Congress of Soissons”

9:00 Barnabás **Szabó**, “The Hispanic monarchy and Sweden in the eighteenth century: Entanglements between unlikely allies”

9:30 Short Break

9:40 Francisco **Cebreiro Ares** & Martin **Almbjär**, “The art of the exequatur: Swedish consular appointments and the Junta de Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros”

10:10 Manuel **Lucena Giraldo** & Kenneth **Nyberg**, “Too many things at the same time? Scientific diplomacy in Spain and Sweden in the 1750s”

10:40 Coffee Break

11:10 Andreas **Önnerfors**, “The Swedish envoy De la Gardie and his time in Spain 1813–1815”

11:40 Patricia **Hertel**, “Vienen los suecos: Swedish tourism to Francoist Spain between aversion and attraction”

12:10 Short Break

12:20 Discussion about the future

13:00–13:10 Conclusion

Abstracts

Francisco Javier Ponce Marrero (javier.ponce@ulpgc.es)

A first comparative approach to Spanish and Swedish humanitarian mediation during the First World War

Both Spain and Sweden were neutral in the First World War. Both countries suffered, albeit to different degrees, from the increasing economic pressures and demands imposed on them by belligerents due to their proximity, but they maintained the neutrality. Within a necessary comparative approach on different aspects, we propose now a concrete approach to the humanitarian mediation and its significance in the context of Spanish and Swedish foreign policies.

In Spain, the foreign policy of Alfonso XIII was a key factor in maintaining Spanish neutrality. The Spanish king intervened much more in both foreign policy and domestic policy than was normal in other European constitutional monarchies. This was in part due to the weaker constitutional character of the Spanish government. Alfonso XIII, the son of an Austrian archduchess and husband of a British princess, let himself be courted by both sides, thus hoping to improve Spain's position as a mediator in the conflict. He therefore undertook a wide range of humanitarian actions from an office that he established in the palace. He tried to relieve the suffering of the war on both sides: his efforts enabled the exchange of prisoners and guaranteed the free passage of hospital ships, as well as other humanitarian goals. This earned the king of Spain the recognition and gratitude of the belligerent powers, to whom he wished to appear as the representative of the most important neutral country, although his desire to mediate in the peace would come to nothing.

For Sweden, the conflict implied an intensified humanitarian engagement. In tandem with a more interventionist state, humanitarian organizations, voluntary associations, and civic society grew in importance in Sweden during the war, as did national relief, philanthropy, and charity. Swedish commitment to neutrality was a fixture of Scandinavian political culture; it was regarded as a morally superior position to that of military alliances and as furthering peace in international relations. Humanitarianism was increasingly vital to this policy, and the Swedish efforts also enabled the exchange of prisoners, as well as other relief actions. We see that in the Swedish case, the neutral position opened up space for public and private humanitarian endeavours of previously unknown dimensions and range. It offered a certain independence of action and enhanced, and perhaps even changed, the national self-image.

Therefore, there are some evident differences between both cases: the royal action as the most important endeavour in Spain, and the much more plural actors in the case of Sweden, with a greater impact in the national self-image. Anyway, in 1918 the four years of war ended in peace between victors and vanquished, with few real opportunities for pacifists or neutral countries.

Benito Peix Geldart (benito.peixgeldart@naringslivshistoria.se)

Neutrals against war: Swedish-Spanish initiatives within the League of Nations 1933–1936

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview and analysis of Swedish-Spanish collaboration within the League of Nations in the mid-1930s in the light of the key terms *neutrality* and *pacifism*. The paper focuses specifically on the political and diplomatic negotiations between Spain and Sweden leading to the joint declarations of the neutrals in the League of Nations in 1934 and 1936 (the *Memorandum of the Six* and the *Manifest of the Seven*). Based on a large number of primary archival sources (mainly diplomatic dispatches and PMs) available in both Swedish and Spanish archives, it is argued that Swedish-Spanish cooperation was more intense and important than generally

admitted, and that both countries played an active role in the League of Nations, promoting an atmosphere that could facilitate international collaboration and minimize the risk of war, perceived at that time as a real and immediate threat.

Santiago Gorostiza (santiago.gorostiza@sciencespo.fr)

Building a database of the Swedish volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)

Launched in 2014, the Digital Information System on the International Brigades (SIDBRINT) is an online database managed by the University of Barcelona (<http://sidbrint.ub.edu/en>). It currently holds more than 30,000 records of international volunteers that travelled to Spain to fight for the Republic against the military insurrection led by General Franco. By late 2020, however, the database includes less than 300 Swedish volunteers, while Bertil Lundvik (1980) already identified 501 Swedes among the Republican soldiers in Spain – a number that the PhD thesis of Benito Peix Geldart (2013) has increased to 552. After introducing the lists of Lundvik and Peix Geldart into the SIDBRINT system during the spring of 2021, as well as scanning throughout the collections on Swedish volunteers at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the purpose of this communication will be to present the database to researchers interested in the relations between Sweden and Spain during the Spanish Civil War, while at the same time opening the possibility to further complement and refine the records of Swedish volunteers with additional information. Conceived as a work in progress, from the perspective of digital humanities SIDBRINT holds a great potential to become a key tool for the studies on the International Brigades, as well as on the trajectories of transnational volunteers from the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War.

Germán Jiménez Montes (g.jimenez.montes@gmail.com)

Connections between Sweden and Andalusia (1500–1650): Trade and identity

This contribution examines the commercial connections between Sweden and Andalusia, the southernmost region of the Iberian Peninsula and main node for the Spanish navigation to the Americas, from 1500 to 1650. This paper is divided into three parts:

The first one analyses the commodities traded between Andalusian and north European markets, especially the coasts on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. On the one hand, timber and grain from northern Europe. On the other, salt and agriculture products from southern Europe. This commercial circuit was fueled by American silver, which north European shipmasters received in exchange for their shipping services.

The second part analyses the actors who were involved in this commercial circuit, with a special focus on the role of Swedish shipmasters. These shipmasters were not just passive actors in long-distance trade; they were risk-takers and the main intermediaries of information between important commercial centers in Europe. This section examines how they obtained a proper understanding of commercial opportunities abroad, i.e., Andalusia, and of the institutional framework that they could use for protecting their commercial rights in a foreign territory.

The third part examines how temporary migration – like the seasonal migration conducted by shipmasters – contributed to shape national identities abroad, before the emergence of the modern nation-state. This last section reflects on how north European shipmasters negotiated their identity in early modern Spain. In the context of the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) between the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch, these shipmasters were often suspected of coming from the Dutch Republic and, thus, being enemies of the Habsburg king. Because of this, Dutch shipmasters sometimes concealed their origins, while non-Dutch shipmasters stressed their *national* identity as

Flemish, German or – in the case of this case study – Swedish. This significantly contributed to the way north European migrant community were seen in Andalusia and the Spanish Monarchy.

Sven Olofsson (sven.olofsson@miun.se)

Swedish copper on Spanish ships: Production, trade and diplomacy during the second half of the 18th century

The international market for thin copper sheets increased dramatically in the 1770s as English vessels operating tropical seas were sheathed in copper plates to prevent attacks of shipworm and seaweed. If the market took off when the English Royal Navy decided to cover all ships with plates, it skyrocketed when British slave traders took the copper sheathing to their hearts in the early 1780s.¹

The competitive advantage of putting copper plates on West Indian vessels forced other colonial powers, like France and Spain, to follow suit. Although France lacked mining facilities and continuously imported large quantities of copper from Sweden, Spain relied mainly on copper supply from their own colonies. Nevertheless, unpredictable deliveries from abroad, increased requests from the Spanish treasury and the establishing of a naval factory in Ferrol, created a shortage in copper supply in 1780. When historian Elinore Barrett examines the royal efforts to raise the copper production, by investing in new mines in Mexico and Rio Tinto in Spain, she just mentions the possibility to buy copper from Hungary and Sweden. This was previously avoided by the Crown because of the high prices.² Nevertheless Spain ordered 4 tons from Sweden in 1779 and increased the imports to 70 tons and more in subsequent years. Most Swedish copper exported to Spain went to Cadiz, followed by a few substantial deliveries to Ferrol (table 1).

The reason why Barrett missed these veins of copper import is unclear. Spain had not bought Swedish copper since 1741 (figure 1) and how the business was facilitated is also unclear. There is some evidence that the Spanish king was negotiating with the Swedish Consul Gahn in Cadiz, through his intermediary, Italian merchant Greppi 1782.³

Another question is whether it was a challenge for the Spanish crown to access a share of Swedish copper exports in competition with other customers or if the Swedish actors were keen to reopen contact with an old customer. According to Swedish export statistics, there was a boom in the market these years and numbers reveal that other countries imported unusually large amounts of extra ordinary copper sheets. In the beginning of the 1780s, Portugal imported 70 tons, France 140 tons and ports around the Mediterranean, predominantly Cadiz, altogether 200 tons. In 1783 and 1784, Spain imported on their own 191 tons and 105 tons, but the following year the Swedish export of extra ordinary copper sheet declined, and the Swedish boom was over.

Table 1: Swedish export of copper to Spanish destinations 1781–1795 (Tons)

¹ Solar and Rönnbäck show that copper sheathing prolonged the life of slave ships with 50 per cent, the sailing speed increased with 16 per cent, and this contributed to reduce the mortality among the slaves with 50 per cent. Peter M. Solar and Klas Rönnbäck, Copper sheathing and the British slave trade, in *Economic History Review*, 68, 3 (2015), pp. 806–829.

² Olofsson, Copper on the move – A commodity chain between Sweden and France 1720–1790, in Holger Weiss (ed.), *Locating the Global: Spaces, Networks and Interactions from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century* (2020). Elinore Barrett, Copper in New Spain's eighteenth century economy. *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas*, vol 18: issue 1 (1964).

³ Cádiz Historical Provincial Archive, Contract between Gahn and Greppi, date 26 March 1782. See also Klemens Kaps, Small but powerful: networking strategies and the trade business of Habsburg-Italian merchants in Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century. *European Review of History*, vol 23, No. 3 (2016), pp. 427–455.

Destination	1781	1782	1783	1784	1785	1786	1787	1788	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794	1795
Spain					0,7								7		
Malaga											4				
Ferrol			17	19											
Cadiz	71	3,7	174	86	5	10		0,02							0,7
Total	71	3,7	191	105	5,7	10	0	0,02	0	0	4	0	7	0	0,7

Source: Arkivcentrum Dalarna, Familjegraven F1:2, för perioden 1779–1799. The deliveries to Cadiz consisted mainly of “forged copper”. The deliveries to Ferrol consisted of 17 tons of forged copper 1783 followed by 5 tons gar copper and 14 tons forged copper 1784.

A. Jorge Aguilera López (jorge.aguileralopez@helsinki.fi)

Beyond the unsuccessful alliance: Spanish-Swedish relations in the age of Philip II (1571–1598)

King Johan III tried to get closer to Catholic Europe for various reasons. One of those reasons was to obtain the huge Neapolitan inheritance of his Polish wife, under control of King Philip II of Spain. Johan III proposed to Philip II to form an alliance and offered to rent his powerful navy and use it against the Dutch rebels in exchange for the Neapolitan inheritance. Although initially the Spanish king did not pay too much attention to the Swedish proposals, the possibility of reestablishing Catholicism in Sweden, the utility of an ally in those latitudes and especially the need to reinforce the Spanish armada, made Philip II reconsider the matter and he finally sent an ambassador to Stockholm (Francisco de Eraso).

The embassy (1578–1579) did not obtain the desired results from either side and the negotiations and proposals remained at a standstill. This was due not only to the high pretensions of each side, but also to the changes produced in international politics. Despite the “diplomatic failure”, the approach between the two monarchies had a positive impact on trade: from the 1580s onwards, there was a considerable increase in Swedish trade (promoted by the royal family) towards Spain: timber, tar and other naval stores were shipped to the South in exchange for salt, money and other exotic products.

Traditionally, historiography has overlooked the relevance —if not the existence— of these early connections. Instead it has generally highlighted almost exclusively the period from the moment when both monarchies met on opposite sides during the ‘Thirty Years’ War to the subsequent establishment of greater and more fluid correspondence as a result of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Using unknown and little studied documents mainly preserved in the General Archive of Simancas, this proposal aims to publicize and develop these early Spanish-Swedish connections and their consequences.

Enrique Corredera Nilsson (enriquenilsson@gmail.com)

Describing Iberia: Nils Nilsson Brahe’s travel to Spain and Portugal in 1655

In the last days of 1654, a letter reached young Nils Nilsson Brahe while in Paris. Brahe, a twenty-two-year-old scion of one of Sweden’s most powerful noble families, was to leave the French court and pay a visit to Philip IV in Madrid, heading later towards Portugal. His mission in Madrid was simple but not irrelevant, for he had to officially inform the Spanish sovereign of king Charles X’s accession to the Swedish throne. Suddenly appointed as the king’s representative, the young nobleman added an unexpected task and destination to the cavalier tour he was making across Europe. Brahe reached the Spanish capital in late January 1655, leaving towards Lisbon at the spring’s beginning.

During his short stay at Philip IV's court, as well as during his time in Portugal, young Brahe kept correspondence with this uncle Per Brahe 'the younger'. The present paper proposes to use this correspondence as a basis to gain an insight into the views a young Swedish nobleman had of the Iberian Peninsula in the mid-seventeenth century. How did Nils Brahe depict the different places he visited while in Spain and Portugal? What did Nils Brahe consider could be relevant information to his uncle, who at age fifty-three was an influential nobleman and high-ranked military officer back in Sweden? In other words, what does this little episode of the Iberian-Swedish relations tell about the ways power was exerted and information was transmitted in mid-seventeenth century Europe?

Renate Schreiber (renate.schreiber@gmx.at)

Queen Kristina of Sweden in Brussels in 1654/55

After renouncing the Swedish throne, in summer 1654 Queen Kristina traveled through Germany to Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands. Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, welcomed her on behalf of the Spanish King. Kristina received the governor very politely. Emperor Ferdinand III sent Count Montecuccoli, whom she already knew and appreciated, as special envoy to the Queen. His personal records are an important source about the Queen's stay in the Spanish Netherlands.

Despite her abdication, the Habsburgs had great expectations. King Philip IV of Spain was hoping for her mediation in the peace negotiations with France. But since the Queen was already staying in Spanish territory, the French questioned her neutrality. Rumours soon arose that she could be instated as regent in the Netherlands or in Naples. On December 23rd, 1654 the Queen moved to Brussels. The governor conceded her his own apartments in the ducal palace. She was welcomed with various festivities.

Although Kristina's financial demands on Sweden were not settled as yet, she converted to Catholicism. On December 24th, 1654, she secretly made the Catholic profession of faith in the palace chapel before the Dominican Juan Guêmes. High-ranking members of the court (Leopold Wilhelm, count Fuensaldaña, count Montecuccoli and others) were present as witnesses. Her conversion to the Catholic faith was kept strictly secret, because Philip IV had strong differences with Pope Innocent X. His successor Pope Alexander VII learned of the baptism in May 1655. The cost of the Queen's stay put an enormous strain on the court's treasury in Brussels. On February 10th, 1655, the Queen moved to the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels and stayed there until September 22nd, 1655, when she left for Rome.

The Queen suffered from chronic lack of funds. Her personal extravagance led to constant financial difficulties; delayed payments from Sweden made this worse. The Queen never had felt a profound longing to adopt the Catholic faith. She refused spiritual conversations and books, avoided confession and responded to reproaches that she was not a "prayer sister". Neither the Pope nor the House of Habsburg was very pleased with the "Catholic" Kristina.

Kristina asked the Emperor for financial help, as Sweden was causing problems due to her conversion. In order to oblige Habsburg, she offered to support the Spanish army in the Spanish Netherlands, by recruiting in Germany 10,000 men for the Spanish troops at her expense and in her own name, as Spain had a bad reputation as warlord. Philip IV naturally wanted to accept this offer but the Archduke and Fuensaldaña objected, considering that Kristina did not take the war seriously. They said the Queen must then be given appropriate compensation, be it money or land. Philip IV answered that one should accept the Queen's offer, while the compensation could be discussed later. By the time the letter from the King reached Brussels in September 1655, the Queen had already definitely left for Italy.

Ingmar Söhrman (ingmar.sohrman@sprak.gu.se)

The supposed Scandinavian origin of the Goths: An emblematic argument in Spanish historiography.

When the Spanish Reconquest started in 718 the Gothic heritage was very important and the ‘rebel leader’, Don Pelayo, insisted on his ‘Gothicness’ as did his successors. The Gothic ilk legitimized them, and their Scandinavian heritage made them even more ancient and rightful rulers. The supposed Scandinavian origin of the Goths was turned into a strong argument. There are historiographic and literary remnants of it up until the C17 and even later.

The Visigoths had seen themselves as the rightful successors of Rome, and when the Moors were invited to fight the last Visigoth king, Roderic, as he had killed his predecessor, and the “rightful” heirs looked at the Mooresque troops as a resource to regain power. Roderic was defeated, but the Moors stayed on until the small kingdom of Granada fell in 1492.

Pelayo who led the Gothic reconquest was eager to connect his family with the Duke of Galicia, who was royal, in order to gain legitimacy for Pelayo’s family which he managed to do as his daughter married the duke’s son. The royal bond was important for him but Spanish chronicles from the 10th century and onwards saw the Scandinavian bond as a way of strengthening their pretention of becoming the rulers of the Peninsula. There were, of course, quite a few wars between the kings of smaller realms on the peninsula. However, the interest in the Scandinavian origin made Archbishop Ximénez de Rada and his pupil, king Alphonse X, (13th century) include Scandinavian history in their chronicles. The Goths and Scandinavia occupied an important part of the king’s history, which was also used in Sweden as a source for knowledge about the ancient Swedish history in the late Middle Age. This contact in both directions is often overseen.

There are two last consequences of this connection. One took place at the Concilium in Basel in 1436 when Spain and Sweden both claimed the main seat as they represented the Gothic heritage. The Spanish delegate won claiming that he represented the audacious Goths who had dared leave the country while the Swedes were the less courageous ones who had remained in Scandinavia. The other event took place during the peace treaty of the War of 30 Years in the 17th century as the Spanish negotiator Saavedra Fajardo met the Swedish representative and came to take an interest in the Goths and wrote a long history of the Goths after he returned to Spain.

Pelayo Fernández García (pelayo.fer.gar@gmail.com)

Spain and Sweden's international redefinition around the Congress of Soissons

In the middle of 1728, a meeting of the main European powers was called. The most relevant among them were Spain, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and the Empire, but other more distant powers such as the kingdom of Poland, Denmark, Sweden or even Russia also had representation there.

Swedish diplomatic interests were mainly focused on economic and trade issues, with the North Sea power trying to spread its products throughout the Mediterranean markets. This is why it is not strange to see that among his papers is documentation about another competing nation, the Netherlands, and the political and commercial aspirations of those and other powers in their negotiations at Soissons.

Negotiations around the Ostend company were one of the main Dutch interests, and they hung in the balance also linked to Spanish trade in America, linked to the commercial interests of France and the United Kingdom. Representing the Spanish nation were the Duke of Bournonville, the Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, and Don Joaquín Ignacio de Barrenechea as plenipotentiaries.

The King of Sweden sent the Barons of Sparr and Gedda as his plenipotentiaries to Soissons, who had to represent the interests of their nation around the French court. However, diplomatic and representative complications of the envoys slowed down their participation in official meetings, and they had to renegotiate the terms of their full powers to be recognized accordingly. Through the correspondence and diplomatic documentation of the Spanish and Swedish envoys, this paper aims to analyze the international relations between the two countries in the late second third of the 18th century. Despite their geographic remoteness, this did not prevent these men from having direct petitions between the two Courts, sometimes unexpected, but representative of the complexity of the international political system, based on balance, during the last century of the modern age.

Barnabás Szabó (szabo_barnabas@phd.ceu.edu)

The Hispanic Monarchy and Sweden in the eighteenth century: Entanglements between unlikely allies

In 1703, the Council of State (*Consejo de Estado*) of the Hispanic Monarchy treated a complaint from “Everardo” Schuyl, the vice-consul of the King of Sweden in Ayamonte, in which he claimed that he had been abused by soldiers and the local population on the basis of his “contrary” (i.e. non-Catholic) religion. Dated from the same year, the Spanish Inquisition launched a process against “Enrique Andrés” for Lutheranism in Cartagena de Indias. These incidents do not paint a particularly cordial picture of Hispano-Swedish relations in the early eighteenth century; they seem to be a better illustration for religious intolerance and the rejection of the “heretics” from the North by Spanish authorities and subjects alike.

Yet the two cases also suggest that relations in the early modern period between Sweden and Spain were not merely based on diametric opposition between a Protestant and a Catholic monarchy. The Swedish consul’s presence in the Andalusian town bordering Portugal, and a Swedish subject’s conflict with the Inquisition in a Spanish colony demonstrate a significant Swedish presence in the European and American territories of the Hispanic Monarchy, most likely related to trade. The European context was also changing in favor of a better understanding between Spain and Sweden: the War of the Spanish Succession was already unfolding, and the Franco-Spanish (Bourbon) alliance hoped to engage the King of Sweden, himself already embroiled in the Great Northern War, for the anti-Habsburg alliance.

Economically and politically, Sweden and Spain were building stronger ties in the 1700s. Through the cases of Schuyl and Andrés, this paper tries to identify the most important points of interaction between Spain and Sweden in the early 1700s, including their conflictual and cooperative aspects. First, I provide an overview of the process that led to a perhaps not very pronounced, but definitely existing alliance between the Spain of Philip V and the Sweden of Charles XII. This process had started after the Thirty Years War, when European states had gotten into an array of conflict with each other over their involvement in global commerce and empire building. While Spain and Sweden both had to face the challenges of building and maintaining a commercial empire, they seldom came into direct conflict in the process. This could have contributed to an unlikely, but logical alliance between Sweden and Spain, expressions of which I would like to look at in the second part of the paper. I will conclude by looking ahead to see how this uneasy rapprochement developed up to the French revolution, and by drawing a balance of the Swedish-Spanish entanglements in the context of the emergence of trade as the *sine qua non* of state activity during the eighteenth century.

Francisco Cebreiro Ares (francisco.cebreiro@usc.es) & Martin Almbjär
(martin.almbjar@hist.uu.se)

The art of the exequatur: Swedish consular appointments and the Junta de Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros

The aim of this paper is to analyze the emergence of a new consular network for Sweden in Spain –as a late-comer in comparison with other countries like England and France– in the second half of the 18th century and the political and institutional responses of the Spanish authorities to this establishment. In order to achieve this objective, primary sources from both countries are studied. Primarily, we make use of the sources in the *Junta de Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros*, the government agency tasked with approving or declining the applications for consular appointments in Spain. An approved candidate for a consulate received an exequatur, a royal approval. This Spanish political institution had developed a sophisticated administrative process and both documents and individuals faced a detailed scrutiny. The first conclusions of this paper shown: the profile of the individuals appointed as consuls by Sweden in Spain, the institutional structures of Swedish consular representation, and the differences in political culture between two distant neighbors in Europe at the end of the Ancien Régime.

Manuel Lucena Giraldo (manuel.lucena.giraldo@cchs.csic.es) & Kenneth Nyberg
(kenneth.nyberg@gu.se)

Too many things at the same time? Scientific Diplomacy in Spain and Sweden by the 1750s

It is not easy to be a traveler, especially if you are a scientist. But in this respect, connections between Sweden and Spain in the European “periphery” can offer unique insights into cosmopolitan science and imperial networks. Our paper will discuss the case of Swedish botanist Pehr Löfving and what his journey to Spain and South America in the 1750s can tell us about the Linnaean enterprise, great power politics and imperial reforms. By exploring the background, the motives and the results of Löfving’s travels from both a Spanish and a Swedish point of view we hope to show how combining these contexts makes us understand his final journey to Guyana in a more truly global perspective.

Löfving’s interaction with the beginning of colonial reforms in Spanish America is interesting not least because it illustrates clearly the flaws of previous interpretations of Linnaeus’ so-called ‘apostles’ and how he sent them out into the dangers of the world. There are contradictory versions about how Löfving’s journey to Spain came about, but even if it was exclusively Linnaeus’s initiative, as seems likely at first, the power to realise it – and even more so the continuation to South America a few years later– was entirely in the hands of the Spanish authorities. Their motives were not the same as those of Linnaeus, Löfving or other interested parties, a fact that helps illustrate the negotiated nature of how Linnaean science travelled and colonial enterprise was organized.

According to preserved diplomatic correspondence, it was Linnaeus who approached the Spanish ambassador to Stockholm, the Genoese Jerónimo de Grimaldi, in the autumn of 1750, and suggested that one of his students could be sent to Spain to advance the study of Spain’s flora according to the latest (that is, his own) scientific methods. He also asked the Spanish government to fund the work since it would not be possible to raise money in Sweden for it. Grimaldi supported the proposal and sent it to Madrid, where it was approved. After being notified in early January 1751, Linnaeus named Löfving as his choice to undertake the assignment. It is unclear whether the prospect of going to America was already raised at this early stage. Although the Spanish may not have considered it that way, Linnaeus himself probably saw the journey to Spain as a chance to put one of his students on a path to the New World. This was very interesting territory. Not only for

science, but for diplomacy and organization of imperial frontiers, population and economy. Soft power was a precondition of hard power, then as it is now.

Andreas Önnarfors (andreas.onnerfors@hist.uu.se)

The Swedish envoy De la Gardie and his time in Spain 1813–1815

During the final phase of the Napoleonic wars, Jacob Gustaf Pontusson De la Gardie (1768–1847) was appointed Swedish envoy to Spain between 1813–1815. Whereas the reasons for his deployment frequently have been interpreted in the light of his presumed opposition to the new dynasty in Sweden, less attention has been directed towards what De la Gardie actually did during his time in Spain. This becomes even more significant as he arrived in the immediate aftermath of Spanish independence in 1814 and the restoration of Ferdinand VII which was supported by Sweden in alliance with Britain.

De la Gardie was not only a prominent Swedish politician, but deeply engaged in the fraternal culture and cultural life of his time. During a previous stay in Vienna 1799–1801, he authored a diary/journal with extensive descriptions of society and culture during a crucial period of European politics. The same applies to his time in Madrid. In previous scholarship it has hitherto only been noticed that De la Gardie visited the workshop and acquired art from Goya (Bjurström 1961), but the vast documentation of his stay in Spain has hitherto not been investigated systematically. My paper will present insights from primary research into volumes 283–304 in the De la Gardie collection of Lund university library, Sweden.

Patricia Hertel (patricia.hertel@unibas.ch)

Vienen los suecos: Swedish tourism to Francoist Spain between aversion and attraction

Among the countries that benefitted most from the growth of mass tourism in the 1960s and 1970s were Spain, Portugal, and Greece, all of which were at that time under authoritarian regimes that saw tourism as a means of bolstering both their weak economies and their images abroad. The sunny image of tourist destinations was at odds with the darker sides of dictatorships notorious for human rights violations, censorship, and oppression. Whereas the Western European democracies had forged a pragmatic alliance with the authoritarian regimes of Franco and Salazar in the 1950s despite the fact that the latter did not fit into the geopolitical narrative of the “Free West”, criticism of these countries became more frequent in the politicized climate of the 1960s and 1970s – even as the number of tourists vacationing in these dictatorships (and in Greece under the colonels from 1967 to 1974) steadily rose.

The paper explores the political impact of mass tourism by Western Europeans in the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek dictatorships during a period when political values of “democracy” and “freedom” were being widely debated in Europe. Politicians, diplomats, tourism experts, travel companies, and journalists presented tourism as “apolitical,” promoting the idea of holidays as a private matter. In turn, especially leftist politicians and activists advocated tourism boycotts as a political weapon within the reach of each individual traveller against the authoritarian regimes. Both phenomena – the growing tourism numbers to Spain, Portugal, and Greece and the protest against it – took place all over Western Europe. Sweden distinguished itself for a protest that was more mainstream than in other European countries, at least on a rhetorical level. However, that protest did not prevent a steadily growing number of Swedish tourists to go on holiday in Spain, Greece, and Portugal. While paying special attention to the example of Sweden, the paper analyses the ambivalences of Western European tourism to Spain, Portugal, and Greece. It argues that the de-politicization brought forward by tourism successfully contributed to a widespread acceptance of

the Western dictatorship and explores the limits of political activism based on liberal values in the 1960 and 1970s. In a broader context, the paper sheds light on the ambivalent relations between democracies and dictatorships within Western Europe in the crucial years before, during and after the transitions to democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece.